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CASE NOTES
Income Taxes—Installment Method of Reporting: Lessor's Release
of Restoration Rights in Exchange for Three Notes of the Lessee
was not a "Sale or Other Disposition" Which Could Qualify for
the Installment Method of Reporting Income.—Billy Rose's Dia-
mond Horseshoe, Inc. v. United States.'—By an agreement of August
26, 1955, Billy Rose's Diamond Horseshoe, Inc. (Billy Rose) leased
premises known as the Ziegfield Theatre to the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC) for a term ending October 31, 1962. Under the lease,
NBC covenanted to surrender "... the demised premises, in good order
and repair in approximately the same condition as received by the
lessee, depreciation and reasonable wear and tear excepted."2 Upon
taking possession, NBC made substantial physical alterations to the
leased building in order to accomodate the requirements of television
production. These alterations were acknowledged by Billy Rose as
within NBC's rights under the lease. On June 28, 1962, the parties
agreed to terminate the lease prior to its expiration, and to release each
other from any cause of action arising out of the lease. However, one
of several covenants which was not included in the mutual discharge
of obligations was the lessee's duty to return the premises in the same
condition as when received. In a "Compromise Agreement," the parties
agreed that lessee NBC would deliver three promissory notes in the
total amount of $300,000 in "full satisfaction and compromise of
[NBC's] obligation to restore the Ziegfield Theatre to approximately
the same conditions as the same was in when received by [NBC] as
required by . . . the lease."
In reporting income for its fiscal year ending August 31, 1962,
Billy Rose elected the installment method' of reporting the receipts.
Since the first promissory note was not payable until September 4,
1962, no part of the $300,000 was included as income in the taxpayer's
fiscal 1962; rather, the proceeds of the notes were reported as ordinary
income in the fiscal years in which they were received, 1963 and 1964.
With the omission of those proceeds from its 1962 return, the taxpayer
showed a net operating loss of $111,452.50 for that year. Thereafter
Billy Rose filed a claim for refund of taxes paid in its taxable year
ending August 31, 1959, based on the carryback 5 of its fiscal year 1962
net operating loss. The Commissioner rejected that claim. He deter-
mined that the entire face amount of the notes was includible as ordi-
nary income in Billy Rose's fiscal year 1962, the year in which the
448 F.2d 549 (2d Cir, 1971).
2 Billy Rose's Diamond Horseshoe, Inc. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 76, 77 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971).
3 448 F.2d at 550.
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453. The requirements for installment reporting under
§ 453 are, generally, (1) a transaction rising to the level of a "sale" (2) involving
property.
5
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 112(b) (1) (A) (i). The subsection provides that a tax-
payer may "carryback" a net operating loss to each of the three taxable years preceding
the taxable year of such loss.
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Compromise Agreement was signed by Billy Rose and NBC, although
payment on the notes was not actually received during that year. Thus,
the claimed net operating loss carryback to fiscal 1959 was eliminated.
In Billy Rose's suit for a refund,' the District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied taxpayer's motion for summary judgment
for income taxes allegedly illegally assessed and collected, and held
that the proceeds from the transaction between Billy Rose and NBC
did not qualify for the installment method of reporting income? On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit HELD: the release
by lessor Billy Rose of its right to enforce restoration of the leased
property in exchange for three notes of lessee NBC was not a "sale or
other disposition" of property which would qualify under section 453
for the installment method of reporting income; thus, the notes con-
stituted income to Billy Rose in the year when they were received
rather than in later years when they were paid.'
In arriving at its holding, the court applied the capital gains "sale
or exchange" requirement of section 1222 to the analogous "sale or
other disposition" requirement of section 453. Hence the holding in
Billy Rose could signal a departure from the treatment given to capital
gains classification in Commissioner v. Ferrer.9
 The minimum impact
of the court's holding will be the establishment of conflicting criteria
for definition of the terms "sale or other disposition" of property for
capital gains treatment on the one hand, and for the installment ac-
counting method on the other.
This casenote will review the development of the criteria for
classification of releases of contract rights as capital gains, culminating
in the Second Circuit's Ferrer case. It will then examine the court's
refusal to apply the Ferrer criteria to the analogous "sale or other
disposition" requirement of section 453 involved in Billy Rose. Finally,
it will be submitted that the court has laid the foundation either for
movement away from the Ferrer criteria in the capital gains area, or
alternatively for using different, and inconsistent, criteria for classify-
ing a transaction as a "sale or other disposition," depending upon the
purpose of such classification—i.e., for capital gains treatment, or for
the installment accounting method.
Under Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a tax-
payer who correctly elects the installment method need only report as
income in a given year the proportion of installment payments actu-
ally received in that year which the gross profit realized bears to the
total contract price.1" To qualify for treatment under the installment
Section 7422 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 permits a taxpayer to sue in federal
court provided he has filed a timely claim for refund or credit with the Secretary or
his delegate under 6511 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
7 322 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
8 448 F.2d at 550-51.
9 304 F2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
10 For a full discussion of the installment method of reporting income, see Emory,
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accounting method, income—other than the receipts of dealers in
personal property—must be derived from:
(A) a sale or other disposition of real property, or
(B) a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal
property .
In determining whether Billy Rose's claim for the installment
reporting procedure met the statutory criteria, the only question con-
sidered by the court was whether the transaction under review, involv-
ing as it did a contract right, constituted the required "sale" or "other
casual disposition." Nowhere in the installment sale section or else-
where in the Code is the term "sale" defined.' 2 However, the question
of "sale" on the disposition of contract rights has been a frequent
source of litigation in the context of determining whether a transaction
qualifies for capital gain treatment: the Code requires, inter alia, a
"sale or exchange" of a capital asset before granting such treatment."
Accordingly, the Billy Rose court sought to define "sale" for purposes
of installment reporting by utilizing the "sale or exchange" criteria
which courts have developed in determining whether a transaction in
contract rights qualified for capital gains treatment.
In approaching the question of "sale" of contract rights for capital
gains purposes the courts have employed two rationales. One focuses
upon the outcome of the transaction by examining the subject matter
of the transaction in the hands of the transferee; the other asks
whether the contract right involved in the transaction did or did not
constitute a capital asset." Under the former approach, the primary
consideration is whether the contract rights transferred or assigned
survived the transaction and maintained their existence in the hands of
the transferee." The latter approach looks to the nature of the contract
right; i.e., did the contract right transferred constitute in the hands of
the transferror an independent interest in an underlying capital asset,
regardless of whether or not the contract right survived the particular
transaction." Neither of these rationales actually sets a standard for
The Installment Method of Reporting Income: Its Election, Use, and Effect, 53 Cornell
L. Rev. 181 (1968).
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 453(b)(1)(A)-(B),
12 see Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), in which the Court observed:
A "sale" ... is a common event in the non-tax world; and since it is used in
the Code without limiting definition and without legislative history indicating
a contrary result, its common and ordinary meaning should at least be per-
suasive of its meaning as used in the Internal Revenue Code.
Id. at 570-71.
18 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222(3).
14 See Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Incomes—the
Ferrer Case, 20 Tax L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Eustice).
lo Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958); General Artists
Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc.,
204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
18 Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
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"sale or exchange" under the tax laws. Rather they have produced
categories of contract rights which upon disposition may qualify for
capital gain. Although in applying the survival analysis to contract
rights controversies courts may insist that they are examining the form
of the transaction for a "sale or exchange," they are in fact relying on
the nature of the contract rights involved to "survive" and thus con-
stitute a sale. Similarly, when courts apply the "independent interest"
analysis they reject the necessity of an inquiry into the form of the
transaction and go directly to an analysis of the asset.
In reviewing the Compromise Agreement of the parties in the
instant case, the Billy Rose court applied the "survival" analysis to
determine whether Billy Rose's transfer of his right of restoration
could qualify as a "casual sale or casual disposition" for the installment
reporting of income. Essentially the court reasoned that Billy Rose had
merely surrendered a right for a sum of money. Billy Rose's right of
restoration "vanished" in the transaction and did not "survive" in the
hands of NBC. Thus the transaction was viewed as having merely
extinguished the rights and obligations of the parties under the lease.
The court held that Billy Rose had not "sold" or "otherwise disposed"
of "property" and concluded that the release of a contract right which
merely relieves the transferee from a contractual obligation is not a
"sale" for purposes of the installment method of reporting income."
The court's standard for "sale" was derived from its earlier de-
cision in Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc. 18 There the question pre-
sented was whether proceeds, received by the taxpayer from a manu-
facturer of drugs for agreeing to terminate a contract under which the
taxpayer had been granted the exclusive right to distribute the manu-
facturer's products in a particular community, should be treated as
capital gain. The Starr Bros. court, although conceding that the tax-
payer's rights under the contract were property and by definition
capital assets, emphasized that the transaction merely released the
manufacturer from its obligations and that accordingly it did not
constitute a sale. The court reasoned: "[sjuch release not only ended
the promisor's previously existing duty but also destroyed the promi-
see's rights. They were not transferred to the promisor; they merely
came to an end and vanished.'"° Consequently capital gain treatment
was denied, apparently because nothing had survived the transaction
and, nothing vested in the purchaser after the taxpayer's release of his
contractual claim.
Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit developed its Starr Bros.
rationale by focusing on the "survival" of the contract rights in ques-
tion rather than looking to the form in which the parties cast the
transaction. In General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner," the taxpayer,
17 448 F.2d at 551 -52.
18 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
10
 Id. at 674.
2° 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953).
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a booking agency for entertainers, sought capital gains treatment for
proceeds from an agreement with another booking agency whereby the
taxpayer transferred its rights as the exclusive agent for a particular
singer. Under the agreement the taxpayer's contracts were cancelled
and new ones were executed between the singer and the transferee
booking agency. The General Artists court held that a sale had not
occurred despite the fact that the taxpayer had apparently transferred
his rights in an exclusive contract to a third party. The court viewed
the agreement between the two booking agencies essentially as a release
by the taxpayer to its obligor, the singer, in order to allow the singer
to contract with another booking agency. 21 Thus, the General Artists
decision stands for the proposition that the "survival" analysis may
extend beyond consideration of the formal contract language to a de-
termination of whether the obligor's contractual liabilities have in fact
survived the transactions. This, then, was the analysis employed by
the Second Circuit in its examination of the Billy Rose transaction.
In focusing on whether anything "survived" the transaction, rather
than analyzing the nature of the asset sold, the court determined that
for a sum of money the taxpayer had merely surrendered its right
under a lease to have the Ziegfield Theatre restored. The Compromise
Agreement was viewed as a "release" and in no sense a "sale," at least
insofar as the latter term was defined in the Starr Bros.-General Artists
cases.22
In disposing of the case as it did the court explicitly rejected as a
basis for decision a completely different conception of "sale." Billy
Rose had argued that in Commissioner v. Ferrer" the Starr Bros.
"sale or exchange" test had been materially altered if not overruled,
and hence should no longer control the federal tax treatment afforded
income received upon the disposition of contract rights. In Ferrer, the
taxpayer had acquired the exclusive dramatic production rights to a
novel. Although the author had retained the full legal and equitable
title to the copyright property, taxpayer Ferrer was granted a "lease"
of the exclusive theatrical production rights and the power to prevent
the author's transfer of retained film rights in the copyright property
until the play had been running for a specified period of time. Shortly
thereafter, a motion picture company purchased the film and television
rights from the author and simultaneously obtained a release of
Ferrer's rights in the copyright property. For his release Ferrer re-
ceived a seventeen percent interest in the net profits of the film produc-
tion. In the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the question was
whether the amounts received by Ferrer under the release could con-
stitute capital gain. Since Ferrer had actually released a "bundle of
rights" to the film company, the court considered precisely what
Ferrer had given up and concluded that with the exception of the con-
21 Id. at 361.
22 448 F.2d at 551-52.
28 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
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sideration received for one of the rights involved," Ferrer was entitled
to treat the amounts received under the release as capital gain.
The Ferrer court observed that where capital gains are in issue,
the trend of decisions was to move away from an examination of the
form -
 of the transaction under review toward a thorough analysis of
whether the contract rights involved could be characterized as capital
assets.25 In Ferrer, the court criticized the Starr Bros. decision for its
restrictive "sale or exchange" test which denied capital gain to income
derived from the cancellation or release of contract rights." The Ferrer
court chose a test which examined the nature of the contract rights in the
hands of the taxpayer before the "sale" rather than an analysis focus-
ing on whether anything "survived" the transaction in the purchaser's
hands. The court concluded that contract rights could qualify for
capital gains treatment if in the seller's hands they constituted an
"estate" or an "encumbrance"" on property, which, if itself held,
would be a capital asset.28
 Thus, by explicitly refusing to be concerned
with the form in which the parties cast their particular transaction, 29
the court in Ferrer materially downgraded the sale inquiry stressed in
Starr Bros. In shifting the focus of its capital gains test to a precise in-
24
 Id. at 133-35. Ferrer owned a contingent royalty interest in any consideration
earned by the taxpayer from his sale of the retained film rights. The court concluded
that the portion of the proceeds received by Ferrer from his release which could be
allocated to this right was ordinary income. Ferrer did not obtain a property interest,
legal or equitable, in the film rights; the contract specifically provided that the entire
property interest was retained by the author. Ferrer's only interest was his right to
share in the proceeds from exploitation of property owned by the author and, conse-
quently, the receipts could only be treated as ordinary income. See Eustice, supra note
14, at 7-9.
25 304 F.2d at 131.
25 Id. The Ferrer court observed:
Tax law is concerned with the substance, here the voluntary passing of "prop-
erty" rights allegedly constituting "capital assets," not with whether they are
passed to a stranger or to a person already having a larger "estate." So we turn
to an analysis of what rights Ferrer conveyed.
27 The Ferrer court cited several decisions in which capital gains treatment was
allowed and where the survival of the contract rights was completely irrelevant for
purposes of a "sale": lessee's surrender of his lease to the lessor, Commissioner v.
Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953); lessee's
relinquishment of a right to restrict lessor's renting to another tenant in the same busi-
ness, Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954);
lessee's release of his entire interest to a sublessee, Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
28
 304 F.2d at 130-31. See Eustice, supra note 14, at 12-13.
29
 See Eustice, supra note 14, at 6-7. The author maintains that in fact the court
could have found a traditional Starr Bros. sale since ". . . before the cancellation the
author "could deal only with Ferrer, while after the cancellation he was free to deal with
anyone. Thus the author's rights were 'enlarged' by the cancellation transaction and,
in a sense at least, something did survive the transfer in the hands of the transferee,
thereby suggesting that a true sale was probably present." Thus, the Ferrer court clearly
broke with the Starr Bros. sale or exchange test and established that the question of
sale is not resolved by merely determining whether contract rights "survive" but rather




quiry into the nature of the property involved in a transaction, the
Ferrer court established that previously disqualifying labels such as
"cancellation" and "release" were subsumed in the term "sale" where
the contract rights involved in a transaction could be characterized as
a capital asset. The Ferrer court emphasized that this shift in focus was
especially justified when there existed no "sensible business basis" for
distinguishing between a hypothetical sale and the disposition—a re-
lease—which actually took place. 8°
When the Billy Rose issue came before the district and appellate
courts of the Second Circuit, then, they were presented with the task
of choosing between the Ferrer criteria, which utilize the property
concept in testing for a sale, and the Starr Bros. criteria, which look to
the form of the transaction and hence stress the "survival" standard.
Billy Rose's restoration right under the lease with NBC would qualify,
at least arguably, as "property" under the Ferrer test. The right to
have leased premises restored to a previous condition would appear
to constitute something tantamount to a property right which Billy
Rose could have sold or assigned. Moreover, by Ferrer, the restoration
right was in a capital asset—the leasehold interest of NBC.81 The
cancellation of that right should thereby qualify as the "sale" of
"property."82 However, the Ferrer criteria were considered only
briefly by the district court in Billy Rose and were rejected out of hand
by the Second Circuit. Instead, both courts riveted their decisions to
the "survival" standard of Starr Bros.
The district court in Billy Rose dismissed the argument that the
Starr Bros. cases had been overruled by Ferrer and distinguished the
Ferrer rationale as being of limited application. The court explained:
[I] n capital gains cases, the focus in the Second Circuit has
been on the type of property, not the nature of the disposi-
tion. . • [I]n the instant case, the focus is on the nature of
80 304 F.2d at 131.
81 A lease is normally considered a capital asset of the lessee. See, e.g., J. Chommie,
Federal Income Taxation 272 (1968) ; Rev. Rul. 56-531, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 983.
82 Indeed, precisely this tax treatment was accorded in an earlier case involving
proceeds allocable to the restoration of a leasehold. In Waggoner v. Commissioner, 15
T.C. 496 (1950), gain realized upon receipt of cash compensation from the United States
for property damaged or converted while in possession of the United States under a
lease entered into under threat of condemnation proceedings was held taxable as long
term capital gain. The court characterized the proceeds as payments to the lessor for a
portion of his building and as the substitution, of "one obligation for another; that is
[the United States] made restitution to the petitioners for the property Cas required
under the lease] in cash instead of property." Id. at 502-03. See also Washington Fireproof
Bldg. Co., 31 B.T.A. 824 (1934). There, the taxpayer received a lump sum payment
from a lessee to cover both rent and restoration of the lessor's property. In deciding
whether any or all of the payment was allocable to the restoration obligation, the court
held that "the transaction was substantially similar to a sale and must be treated for
income tax purposes as a 'sale or other disposition' of a portion of [the taxpayer's]
building." Id. at 827, citing § 111 of the Revenue Act of 1928. The case was commented
upon with approval in Waggoner v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. at 502.
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the disposition (i.e., whether it was a "sale" for the purposes
of installment sales provisions), and the . . . Starr Bros. cases
still speak with authority to that question irrespective of what
the holding may be when the question of capital gains treat-
ment is raised.88 •
The district court further emphasized that "[h] ere, unlike Ferrer,
there is a 'sensible business basis' for distinguishing between the re-
lease which occurred and the sale which did not." 84 Billy Rose had
merely transferred his right to have the ZiegfieId Theatre restored.
The court felt that a "sale" of that right to a party other than NBC
would have no practical or legal significance independent of the under-
lying leasehold. It viewed the right of restoration as unenforceable
except in the hands of the owner of the leasehold, and contrasted the
situation in Ferrer where the taxpayer's rights in the play could have
been sold to anyone. Thus, for purposes of applying section 453 to
transactions involving contract rights, the district court identified as
the linchpin of "sale" the value of the contract right in question to a
party other than the obligor."
It is submitted that the Billy Rose district court failed to distin-
guish Ferrer satisfactorily when it characterized that case as one of
limited application. The district court maintained that Ferrer could
be properly applied only where the taxpayer was seeking capital gains
treatment." However, there is nothing in Ferrer to require so narrow
an interpretation or, indeed, anything in the Internal Revenue Code
which suggests a basis for the court's reasoning. Rather it is reasonable,
to conclude that, the Ferrer decision rejected the Starr Bros. survival
standard for all purposes by utilizing criteria which tested the nature
of the property in the hands of the transferor just prior to the trans-
action. Yet, by limiting Ferrer to capital gains and installing the "sur-
vival" standard for section 453 transactions, the district court in Billy
Rose impliedly recognized two tests for defining a sale, the applicability
of which would depend on the income tax treatment sought.
Although affirming the holding of the district court, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ignored the dual interpretation of
"sale" which the lower court had implicitly recognized. Instead, the
appellate court in Billy Rose refused to apply Ferrer because that case
"involved the release of motion picture rights which could have been
sold to any third person. A release of a right to restoration is entirely
different and is not a 'sale' . . . ." 87 Thus, while there exists in the
Second Circuit's decision the inference that the Ferrer criteria for
"sale" can lie only where the contract right involved has a market
83




37 448 F.2d at 552.
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value to parties other than the original obligor, the court never con-
fronted the significance of Ferrer. In resurrecting Starr Bros. and
attempting to distinguish Ferrer on the ground that that case involved
a contract right which could have been resold to third parties and
hence was a contract right which could have been "sold" even under
the Starr Bros. formula, the Billy Rose court appeared to rule, sub
silentio, that the Ferrer test was applicable only to the characterization
of the property right involved rather than to the characterization of
the entire transaction. It is submitted, then, that the Billy Rose court
would have been satisfied that a court applying the Ferrer rationale
to any transaction involving an exclusive contract right such as that
in Billy Rose would be required to reach the same result as a court
applying the Starr Bros. test. For the Billy Rose court, the Ferrer case
can be properly employed only where a contract right is clearly capable
of resale to a third party and hence passes the Starr Bros. survival test.
It is also submitted that the court of appeals was less than accu-
rate in assuming, as an initial premise, that Billy Rose's right of resto-
ration could not have been sold to a third party. Indeed, the district
court in Billy Rose, while pointing out the impracticality in the instant
situation of the "sale" of the restoration right to any party but NBC,
implied that under different circumstances the right would have been
capable of "sale" to a third party. 88
Thus the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed to distin-
guish Ferrer in meaningful terms. Ferrer examined the nature of the
contract right involved as it existed before the transaction under
review and so avoided inquiry into whether anything survived the
transaction and hence into the nature of the transaction itself. Given a
certain kind of property and a transaction in which the transferor for
value divested himself of that property, the Ferrer rationale would
rule that the "sale or exchange" requirement of capital gains was
satisfied, without any discussion of whether the precise nature of the
transaction constituted a "sale." In Billy Rose, however, the court
refused to consider the nature of the property as it existed before the
transaction and returned to the Starr Bros. survival standard as a
means of defining "sale" for the first time since the 1962 Ferrer
decision." Under Starr Bros:, the court was required to examine the
nature of the contract right but only to determine whether the right
still "existed" in the hands of the transferee. That is, it asked whether
the contract right could be sold yet again. If not, the transaction was
as In Hamilton & Main, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 878, 882 (1956), the Tax
Court held that the right of restoration under a lease had been "sold" for purposes of
capital gains where the leased premises had been sold and the restoration right assigned
with them. The district court in Billy Rose appeared to indicate that it would also
recognize "sale" under similar circumstances for purposes of installment reporting of
income. 322 F. Supp. at 82 n.7.
so After Ferrer, the Second Circuit cited the General Artists and Starr Bros. cases
in Brook v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1966), in dicta only and not as a
controlling factor in its decision.
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a release and not the "sale" required under section 453 for installment
accounting of income.
The Billy Rose court limited, indeed rendered meaningless, the
remarks made in Ferrer concerning congressional disapproval of the
Starr Bros. "sale or exchange" test. In Ferrer the court noted that
Section 1241 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code—enacted after Starr
Bros.—provides that amounts received for the cancellation of a lease
or a distributor's agreement were to be considered for tax purposes as
amounts received in exchange for rights under such agreements." The
Ferrer court vigorously maintained that section 1241 reflected con-
gressional disapproval with the Starr Bros. distinction between "sale"
and "release" of contract rights.'" In Billy Rose the court expressly
rejected Ferrer's criticism of Starr Bros., ruling that it was relevant
only to cases involving section 1241, and . in a footnote there exists
the inference that further application of Ferrer may be of no future
significance in the Second Circuit." Thus, where Ferrer had regarded
section 1241 as a buttress to its argument ;hat the Starr Bros. rationale
erroneously distinguished between "sale" and "release,"" the Billy
Rose court may have effectively restricted Ferrer to those specific
transactions qualifying under section 1241.
The consequences of the Billy Rose decision are not clear. While
establishing the survival test of Starr Bros. for installment reporting,
the court failed to articulate a satisfactory position on the viability of
Ferrer. Although it may appear that there now exist two approaches
to the requirement of "sale" in the Second Circuit—one for installment
reporting and another for capital gains treatment—Billy Rose may
have precluded any further application of Ferrer. In other. words, it is
uncertain whether the resurrection of the Starr Bros. rationale can be
narrowly viewed as an implicit recognition that the concept of "sale"
should differ according to the income tax treatment sought. Indeed, it
would be a curious result if, in the aftermath of Billy Rose, the Second
Circuit followed the Starr Bros. rationale in defining the "casual sale
or other casual disposition" required for installment reporting and
retained the Ferrer treatment for the literally more demanding "sale
or exchange" requirement of capital gains. Thus the question after
Billy Rose is whether the Starr Bros. rationale will now be extended
and reintroduced as a test for capital gains. The resolution of this
42 Section 1241 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 provides:
Amounts received by a lessee for the cancellation of a lease, or by a distributor
of goods for the cancellation of a distributor's agreement (if the distributor
• has a substantial capital investment in the distributorship), shall be considered
• as amounts received in exchange for such lease or agreement.
41 304 F.2d at 130-31.
' 42 448 F.2d at 552 n.1. 	 •
42 Two federal circuits having embraced Ferrer also reject Starr Bros. as having
created an unnecessary distinction between sale and release. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. .1954), and United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 324
F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
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issue will presumably be delayed until a taxpayer seeks capital gains
treatment on the disposition of an exclusive contract right such as
that in Billy Rose. Meanwhile, the Billy Rose decision reveals a firm
intention on the part of the Second Circuit to examine the form of
transactions which give rise to taxpayers' claims for preferred income
tax treatment.
JOHN J. GOGER
Labor Law—Successor Employers—Duty to Honor Predecessor's
Collective Bargaining Agreement—NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Services.1—For five years (1962-67) guard services at the Lockheed
Aircraft Service Company at the Ontario International Airport in Cali-
fornia were provided by the Wackenhut Corporation. In 1967, United
Plant Guard Workers of America (UPG) won a representation election
and was certified by the NLRB as exclusive bargaining representative
of the Wackenhut employees at the Lockheed plant. Wackenhut and
the Union entered into a three-year collective bargaining contract on
April 29, 1967. Because Wackenhut's service contract with Lockheed
was due to expire on June 30, Lockheed called for bids from various
suppliers of guard services; the contract was awarded to Burns Interna-
tional Security Services, Inc. Burns, slated to take over on July 1, had
learned at a pre-bid conference on May 15 of the Union's certification
and subsequent contract with Wackenhut.
Burns retained twenty-seven of the Wackenhut guards and added
fifteen Burns guards, brought in from other locations. Burns informed
the former Wackenhut employees that they would have to join the
American Federation of Guards (AFG), a union with which Burns had
contracts at other locations, inasmuch as Burns "could not live with"
the Wackenhut contract.' On June 29, Burns recognized the AFG as
bargaining representative of the plant guards at the Lockheed unit. On
July 12, UPG demanded that Burns not only recognize it as bargaining
representative, but also honor the terms of the existing contract with
Wackenhut. These demands were refused, whereupon UPG filed unfair
labor practice charges!'
The NLRB found a violation of Sections 8(a) (1) and (2) 4 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) in Burns' recognition
and assistance of the AFG, and a violation of Sections 8(a) (1) and
(5) 5
 in Burns' failure to recognize and bargain with UPG and refusal
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It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— . .
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